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This study contends that the low rate of e-marketplace 
acceptance by Asian firms cannot be fully understood 
without analyzing the context within which technology is 
exploited. Current IOS (Inter-Organizational Systems) 
studies emphasize the removal of barriers to 
e-marketplace acceptance in relation to technological, 
organizational, and inter-organizational factors. However, 
the contextual influences of IOS are largely ignored. We 
highlight three levels of contextual influences – structural, 
national/regional, and socio-cultural – that shape the 
adopters’ expectation of e-marketplace applications in 
three Asian regions (India, Taiwan, and China). Our study 
formulates arguments that attempt to flesh out the 
constraint of context as one of the most significant, but 
often neglected, dimensions of e-marketplace acceptance. 
 
1. Introduction  
There has been a rising interest in using 
e-marketplaces (electronic marketplaces) to enable closer 
B2B (Business-to-Business) collaboration. Nonetheless, 
the widespread e-marketplaces have not been adopted 
readily into companies in Asia. The study is an initial 
attempt to explore the reasons for the non-acceptance of 
e-marketplace in inter-organizational contexts situated in 
a different cultural setting. 
An e-marketplace can be defined as a platform that 
uses the Internet to enable buyers and sellers to conduct 
inter-firm trading [3]. There are three generic forms of 
e-marketplace [8]: (1) industry-based (i.e. vertical) or 
product-oriented (i.e. horizontal) e-marketplaces backed 
by founding members, (2) private e-marketplaces, usually 
formed by a single buyer or supplier, to link up their 
business partners, and (3) public e-marketplaces that are 
set up by neutral third party, known as “Net Market 
Makers”, to facilitate business transactions for their 
participants, with their revenue coming from 
subscriptions and transaction-based fees. 
Although e-marketplaces can reduce transaction costs, 
improve process efficiency, and enable virtual 
collaboration among partners, market analysts have 
reported that the majority of them have either closed down 
or are facing difficulties in attracting buyers and suppliers 
[21]. Recent reports, though somewhat limited, have 
shown that sole reliance on the application of the US 
business models in Asia is a recipe for failure [4][8][19] 
[23]. 
The present study seeks to highlight the limitations of 
a technical-economic view of e-marketplace adoption [2] 
[18]. It explains how contextual forces that have shaped 
Asian businesses play an important role in the adoption of 
e-marketplaces.  
 
2. Barriers to the acceptance of 
e-Marketplaces 
Three broad categories of adoption barriers have been 
identified in current literature: technological, 
organizational, and inter-organizational [11][16][25]. 
Technological barriers are concern with technological 
complexity. For example, the adoption of e-marketplaces 
requires effective the use of external network technologies. 
As security technology is still at an embryonic stage, 
transaction risks are endemic. Other major technological 
challenges include system integration, software migration, 
data conversion, and the compatibility of hardware and 
software between partners [19]. For most adopters of 
e-marketplace, the sheer complexity of technological 
problems can prevent them from accepting the new 
technology. 
A common intra-organizational inhibitor is the lack of 
sufficient training and education in the technologies 
involved. Furthermore, the adoption of e-marketplaces 
often requires companies to redesign their internal 
business processes, if the technologies are to be used 
effectively [5][20]. But this is not easy, especially when 
operations are deeply bound by different technologies in 
different organizations. Lee and Clark [20], for example, 
explore two failed attempts to introduce electronic 
exchanges into the potted plants and fresh meat sectors. 
They explain that the ineffective integration of product 
and transaction flow, which caused inconsistent 
purchasing quality, was a major cause of such failure. 
Clark and Stoddard [5] also point out that a key adoption 
barrier is to exchange marketplace data among 
organizations in transaction and replenishment processes. 
They explain that new technologies break old routines and 
the keepers of the old routines often resist, usually 
because they have to master new socio-technical skills 
that are imperfectly realized and barely understood in 
relation to existing ways of doing things.  
Inter-organizational barriers often arise from the 
factor of power and trust [1][11]. For example, in a case 
study of Ford Motors [27], the company was in a strong 
position to instigate the use of electronic procurement 
with its suppliers. However, its attempt to exercise 
coercive power over suppliers (e.g. through the transfer of 
 
 
investment costs to them) resulted in adopters’ resistance. 
Trust factor is another barrier. There are two aspects of 
trust: competence trust, which is concerned with a 
partner’s ability to perform according to expectations, and 
intentional trust, which refers to a partner’s intention not 
to defect from its collaborative party [24]. For instance, 
Hart and Saunders [11] analyze a retail company and show 
that asymmetry of product information-sharing among 
partners may lead to distrust of the market makers’ 
competence, leading to adopters’ abortion from the 
e-marketplace. Allen et al. [1] investigate an unproductive 
e-marketplace called TransLease (designed for 
automobile insurance) and explain how mutual distrust in 
intention arose among buyers (lease firms) and sellers 
(repair agents), stemming from both parties’ conflicting 
goals. From a cognitive perspective, Barrett [4] explains 
why adopters (brokers and underwriters) feared the 
uncertainty and job security brought about by the London 
Insurance Market, where distrust emerged as a result of 
adopters’ negative interpretations of the technology’s 
intention. 
One important matter overlooked in current 
investigations is the role of context, not only as a cause of 
inaction but also as a key factor involved in the production 
of barriers [2]. In this view, barriers to the adoption of 
e-marketplaces may derive from institutional contexts, 
including structural, national/regional, and socio-cultural 
aspects (categories which are not mutually exclusive). 
Structural constraints are key adoption barriers in the 
adoption of e-marketplaces, especially in many 
developing countries in Asia. For example, the ineffective 
infrastructure in telecommunications, financial systems 
(e.g. electronic payment systems), legal and regulatory 
systems (e.g. taxation), and the logistics systems (e.g. 
transportation) will inhibit the adoption of e-marketplaces 
[21].  
Barriers to e-marketplace applications cannot be fully 
appreciated without also understanding the challenges 
that stem from national and regional contexts. This point 
is underscored by a study that examines the adoption of 
e-marketplaces in Cyprus [2]. As the basis for a national 
agenda to transform small-sized enterprises into flexible, 
specialized organizations, the Cyprus government 
initiated a major industry restructuring. Avgerou [2] 
examined the introduction of three consortium-based 
e-marketplaces in the furniture industry. In spite of the 
existence of sufficient technological and financial 
supports, the furniture manufacturers aborted the use of 
these systems. As such, this failure should be seen in 
broader national and regional contexts. 
Historically, Cypriot firms had moved from mass 
production to mass customization in order to pursue niche 
market, using the strategy of flexible specialization. 
However, the e-marketplace had been designed for 
volume transactions (mass production). Using it in the 
context of complex transactions (mass customization) was 
inconvenient. Moreover, the entrepreneurs were family 
owners, who understood their craft, suppliers and markets 
well, but were not at ease with e-marketplace. Hence, it 
was not possible for them to incorporate such systems in 
their existing operations. The owners neither had the skills 
to incorporate the system nor did they have the desire to 
make the changes. They would have had to reconfigure 
their customary business models and introduce 
professional managers into most of the family-owned 
businesses. This would mean asking entrepreneurs to 
relinquish power and undertake radical organizational 
transformation. These developments were all contrary to 
the entrepreneurs’ expectations in adopting 
e-marketplaces, and the project ultimately failed. 
The third impact of socio-cultural constraints on 
adoption failures may be illustrated in the case of the 
failure of SPRINTEL [18]. SPRINTEL was an 
e-marketplace designed for the textile trading community 
in Prato (near Florence, Italy). In spite of the provision of 
sound technical and economic solutions, Prato’s traders 
did not accept the e-marketplace. In contrary, it developed 
distrust among traders. The distrust, which became the 
basis for resistance to the system, was not rooted in 
technical failures of the system but from Prato merchants’ 
socio-cultural concerns. 
Historically, Prato’s traders had established an 
industry network formed by business communities that 
trusted each other. Their social relations were embedded 
within economic activities.  Traders saw little value in 
having exchange systems that enabled faster and more 
reliable transactions. Prato’s traders also preferred 
“high-context” communications (e.g. face-to-face 
encounters with rich body expression), and were worried 
that an e-marketplace might disable these preferred social 
interactions. Additionally, we need to appreciate that these 
Prato traders did not regard maximization of profit as the 
only purpose of business; rather, people participated in 
business as one important way of socialization. Moreover, 
these Prato traders were concerned that an e-marketplace 
might reveal the existence of redundant inventories, 
which, in their cultural context, would mean a public 
confession of business incompetence. Participation in a 
more transparent system would mean that not only other 
traders would know one’s affairs; so would the tax 
authorities. The traders were worried about the impact of 
disclosing information about their sommerso 
(underground economy activities), such as tax evasion, in 
a cultural context where tax payment is seen as fair game.  
While technology is typically thought of as a thing, as 
an entity, it is evident that for the traders of Prato it was a 
social relationship. The SPRINTEL study highlights the 
fact that technology acceptance is not based merely on 
technical excellence and economic gains. People do not 
communicate the meaning that they attribute to a 
technology individually, but collectively, in a common 
sense making. The SPRINTEL case clearly reveals that 
distrust resulted from the technology being interpreted 
negatively as a result of the socio-cultural context into 
which it was introduced. 
Research into contextual influences offers a useful 
lens when examining technology adoption that involves 
cross-cultural transfer. Adopters’ social expectations of 
 
 
technology use are shaped by the context within which 
they normally operate. When researchers investigate the 
adoption of e-marketplaces in differing social, cultural, 
and geographical contexts, the conception of technology 
as a variable whose inherent capabilities premise its 
adoption becomes quite limited. The constraining role of 
context is significant in understanding the origins of 
resistance to technology adoption within organizations. 
 
3. Research Methods 
Our research took place in Commerce One (one of the 
leading vendors of e-marketplaces). The company had 
realized that their Asia headquarters were facing a major 
adoption challenge that had not been foreseen in terms of 
the marketing strategy adopted from the US headquarters. 
The US strategy promoted the benefit of cost reduction 
and process efficiency, but it did not seem to work in Asia. 
In spite of the company’s marketing efforts, the level of 
acceptance remained low. With the help of the company, 
our pilot study involved three of their country portals 
(disguised name) – IndiaMarket (in India),  TaiwanMarket 
(in Taiwan), and ChinaMarket (in China). The first author 
interviewed more than 50 key participants over a 
16-month period (from January 2001 to April 2002). The 
data were mainly based on personal interviews with 
technology providers and adopters. Extensive field notes 
were taken during and immediately after these interviews. 
In this paper we report our preliminary findings 
concerning the contextual constraints that persist in 
e-marketplace adoption in Asia. 
The approach to data analysis that we adopted is one 
that relies upon the contextualist perspectives [2] and 
cross-cultural transfer of technology [18]. An important 
analytical aim is to examine how the different contexts of 
solution providers and potential adoptee influence the 
adopter’s expectation of e-marketplace use.  
Three theoretical angles were used to guide our field 
interviews and investigate the non-acceptance reasons in 
each site. In IndiaMarket, we examined the structural 
context and highlighted the impact of India’s complex 
taxation systems on e-marketplace adoption. In 
TaiwanMarket, we turned to the conditions shaped by the 
national and regional contexts. We explored how industry 
migration in Taiwan had gradually shifted Taiwanese 
adopters’ expectations of e-marketplaces. In ChinaMarket, 
we explored the extent to which the theory of Chinese 
Relationalism informed a different cultural pattern of 
business practice, in contrast to Western 
(Anglo-American) models of commerce. Understanding 
the extent to which such a pattern constitutes a different 
frame offers valuable explanation of the underlying 
resistance to e-marketplace systems in the Chinese trading 
community. 
The three stakeholders in the e-marketplace studied 
consisted of buyers, sellers, and NMMs (Net Market 
Makers, see Figure 1), the latter as information 
intermediary. NMMs provide two important services to 
participating members. First, they offer a technological 
platform for both buyers and sellers to conduct product 
search, procurement, auction and transaction. Secondly, 
NMMs offer physical value-added services to fulfill 
business transactions, including product content 
management, business intelligence, financial payment, 
logistics, and shipping inspection. To sustain revenue, 
NMMs normally charge buyers and sellers a subscription 
or transaction fee for their services. Alternatively, other 
NMMs assist adopters in installing their own proprietary 
e-marketplace systems by charging consulting and 
software licensing fees. The common goal of NMMs is to 
achieve a critical mass of adopters so that they can collect 
enough subscription fees to sustain their services. To 
achieve this, a common adoption strategy is to recruit 
large buyers and attract the associated sellers. The value 
proposition for buyers, offered by these three NMMs, is to 
access more sellers (suppliers), gain best price advantage 
and streamline supply chain processes. 
buyer
seller





Offer value-added services, including logistics provider, financial transaction services, 
content management, business intelligence
Technology infrastructure
Offer services in e-marketplace software, data centres and application service providers
Licensing/consulting fees
Transaction fees, Subscription fees
 Figure 1. The Function of a Net Market Maker 
 
NMMs had a crucial role to play as brokers, in whose 
interests the spread of adoption would be hastened. Yet, 
upon the completion of our fieldwork, most adopters had 
not fully adopted e-marketplace solutions, despite the 
actions of both Commerce One and the NMMs as 
providers of solutions that involved the adoption of the 
e-spaces on sale. The potential adopters were less 
concerned with technological problems, process 
integration, and inter-organizational trust, as emphasized 
in the IOS literature. Although adopters reported common 
constraints imposed by the public infrastructure (such as 
poor telecommunications and electricity provision), they 
seemed to worry more about the crises arising from their 
local contexts. We came to recognize the importance of 
seeing these adopters’ resistance to e-marketplaces as 
something that required careful consideration of the 
influence of contextual conditions. A summary of the 
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4. Findings: Unearth the Contextual 
Influences 
4.1 IndiaMarket case: Taxation Dynamics 
Not until the late 1980s, when the government realized 
the futility of shutting India off from the rest of the world 
and started to liberalize the economy, by opening up the 
Indian business community to international competition. 
Faced with this challenge, Indian businesses began to 
adopt international trade practices. The federal 
government also introduced an Information Technology 
Bill in June 2000 with the aim of integrating the 
fragmented markets that existed among the 30 states 
comprising the federation, in order to attract foreign direct 
investment. 
By late 2000, Indian’s e-commerce appeared to be 
promising.  Large enterprises, such as TELCO, one of the 
flagship TATA companies, began to sell scrap machinery 
and manufacturing surplus to partners through 
e-marketplaces. Increasingly, MICO (a BOSCH 
subsidiary) also sold fuel injection pump inventory to its 
partners over the Internet. Nonetheless, most enterprises 
still could not afford the cost of either setting up 
e-marketplaces. 
In May 2001 IndiaMarket was incorporated to provide 
intermediary information services to Indian business 
communities. It commenced with an early success in the 
form of the introduction of an e-procurement solution for 
DCM Shriram Consolidated Ltd., an e-auction for 
Hindalco (India’s largest aluminum producer), and an 
e-marketplace for Tata International. IndiaMarket’s 
strategic vision was to help Indian enterprises shift their 
trading relationships to e-marketplaces. 
In terms of structural constraints, the lack of sound 
infrastructure was still the primary barrier to the adoption 
of IndiaMarket. These explicit constraints included poor 
infrastructure in financial, logistic, legal and other 
services in India. In terms of financial infrastructure, 
Indian adopters reported that most areas still had no 
efficient inter-bank transaction systems. Issuing a letter of 
credit could involve as many as seven banks and 
government agencies. There were also no monitoring 
systems to evaluate suppliers’ credit risks. In terms of 
logistics infrastructure, there were still few established 
third party logistics providers. It was difficult to keep 
track of consignments as well as to maintain reasonable 
control of traffic in cities. In terms of legal infrastructure, 
the overburdened legal system presented numerous 
difficulties when a legal sanction was needed against 
defaulting debtors. The lengthy legal processes alerted 
buyers to the problems of transacting with suppliers 
lacking credentials. Finally, because of poor 
telecommunications infrastructure, constant power 
breakdowns were a part of life. The demand for electricity 
outstripped supply in many industrial cities such as New 
Delhi and Bangalore. 
These were the explicit structural constraints. 
However, there was one implicit structural constrain that 
was, perhaps the most serious threat to e-marketplace 
adoption: India’s taxation systems. Adopters doubt 
whether an e-marketplace can be localized easily to 
accommodate the complexity of governmental taxation 
variation. One example of this variation is in the way in 
which the central and state governments levy taxes. The 
federal government is empowered to levy central taxes, 
which includes sales, custom and service taxes. The states 
levy sales taxes and excise duty based on the value of 
commodities. Another impediment is the “octroi”, a tax on 
the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or 
sale. The federal government also allows the states to levy 
taxes on inter-state sales. The effect is the creation, within 
each state, of a tariff zone where taxes are levied on 
exports to other states. Even with the ceiling on the 
inter-state sales tax, the cascading nature of the tax system 
produces a situation where effective tax rates are uncertain, 
as tax costs vary with the process of the goods sold.  
Consider the following example of an automobile 
parts manufacturer in New Delhi. Based in state A, when a 
sales forecast plan was proposed, the company had to pay 
pre-sales taxes to the government of state A. The company 
 
 
also had to pay turnover taxes on a fiscal year basis. If the 
company transported products to state B, it had to pay 
excise taxes to the government of that state. Any 
components sold there would also be subjected by the 
local government of state B to local sales taxes, service 
taxes, and turnover taxes. The complexity was 
compounded by the constant variation of the tax structure, 
in terms of both the rate of tax and the range of taxable 
items. With components consisting of several hundred 
parts, putting the mathematics of taxation into a computer 
program would itself be a very difficult task. Moreover, 
one should also appreciate that Indian businessmen are 
always worried about exposure of their various 
tax-avoidance tactics (this is similar to Prato’s case). 
The use of e-marketplaces runs against India traders’ 
social expectation in response to the business conventions 
shaped by those structural conditions. The reasons for 
non-acceptance of the technology can thus be understood. 
 
4.2 TaiwanMarket: Industry Migration 
Before 1998, a hostile political relationship had 
severely handicapped formal business collaboration. The 
softening of those relationships encouraged Taiwanese 
enterprises to extend their manufacturing bases to the 
major cities in China. Adding to this industry migration 
was the strategic transfer by multi-national corporations 
(MNCs) of their regional headquarters to China. For most 
Taiwanese firms, this could involve the migration of their 
whole supply chain to China. In the computer industry, for 
example, Compaq alone procured about US$85 billions in 
Taiwan in 2000. If Taiwanese firms did not move with 
their key buyers, they would soon put their 
long-established business relationship into jeopardy. 
In March 2001, a Taiwanese quasi-government agent, 
Institute for Information Industry (III) decided to help the 
computer industry build an e-marketplace to link up 
buyers (Compaq was the first test site) and suppliers 
(Taiwanese firms). The purpose was to maintain close 
collaboration with these key buyers while assisting 
Taiwanese suppliers to streamline their supply chain 
operations. 
The transformation from domestic to regional 
operation presented a great challenge to Taiwanese firms. 
The migration involved not only moving factories and 
people to China but also managing product designs, 
strategic sourcing, and supply chain activities across the 
different regions of China. For example, the relocation of 
a computer notebook manufacturer required product 
design engineers in Taiwan to work collaboratively with 
manufacturing sites in Shanghai and Xiamen. The 
company often had to hold co-location meetings in order 
to make sure that products were designed to comply with 
specification and manufacturability requirements. 
Face-to-face discussions and conference calls were 
perceived as trustworthy methods of communication. 
Moreover, the company had to extend its supplier bases to 
China, which meant that it had to replace some of its 
Taiwanese tier three suppliers and to source local 
suppliers in China for reasons of cost advantage. 
The context of industry migration helps us to 
understand why these Taiwanese firms were not interested 
in e-marketplaces (presented in the US model) that mainly 
offered the functions of product search, electronic 
procurement, and auction. In the context of industry 
migration, Taiwanese firms’ managerial attention was 
more concerned with collaborative design, strategic 
sourcing, supply chain management, customer retention, 
and regional operation. The e-marketplace did not match 
this expectation and was considered to be of little use. 
 
4.3 ChinaMarket: Chinese Relationalism 
In 2000, China faced the challenge of entering the 
WTO (World Trade Organization). The government 
sought to transform key national enterprises (such as steel 
industry) in order to prepare them for the transition from 
the traditional planned economy to a market economy. To 
achieve this end, the government agent (The Development 
Research Center of The State Council) initially planned to 
construct an unprecedented industrial park, big enough to 
accommodate ten key business sectors. International 
traders could visit this industrial park, search products, 
identify potential business partners, and achieve one-stop 
shopping. 
The establishment of such an industrial park required 
enormous investments, in terms of money, land, and other 
resources. Additionally, state planners envisaged that 
upon completion such an industrial park could result in 
major traffic problems, the possibility of an increase in 
criminality through concentrating major commerce, as 
well as an increased demand for enhanced public services. 
Thus, from the state perspective, the risks associated with 
such a project were high. Building a vast incubator on 
such a scale would also have major socio-spatial 
implications for the host region.  
Eventually, the planners conceived the concept of a 
virtual business park, incorporated as ChinaMarket.com 
in March 2000, with the aim of enabling the idea of an 
e-WTO response (i.e. using electronic means to respond 
to the WTO challenge). An American model of commerce 
guided its design. 
The launch was not entirely successful. Although 
ChinaMarket consultants emphasized the benefits of cost 
reduction, process efficiency, and business opportunities 
(especially access to more international buyers), adopters 
still expressed difficulties in relating the systems to their 
existing business practices. To appreciate this dilemma, 
we need to understand the socio-cultural context in which 
the Chinese conduct their business activity. This involves 
Guanxi (relationship) networks, high-context 
communication, and in-group favoritism [13][22][15]. 
In the American model of commerce [18], the purpose 
of business emphasizes optimal economic gains 
achievable under a model of rational assumptions (this 
generalization is only for illustration; in fact, American 
businessmen also emphasize relationship-based trade, see 
[9]). Cost and efficiency are two important criteria of this 
model. For example, buyers are conceived as agents 
wishing to invest in technology in order to reduce search 
 
 
costs (by identifying suppliers more quickly), transaction 
costs (by increasing process efficiency), and labor costs. 
Buyers will readily replace suppliers should they find 
preferable substitutes that can offer better product quality 
at a lower price. If there are non-repudiation issues, buyers 
and suppliers can settle their disputes through legal 
assistance. 
Chinese traders operate with a different approach to 
business, using a different frame of assumptions (note: 
again, the generalization is for explanatory purpose; it will 
be problematic when different regions of Chinese traders 
are considered). Because contemporary China has not yet 
established a sound market and legal infrastructure, 
entrepreneurship often follows a culturally conventional 
approach of building business from family-based 
networks.  In this context, since most non-repudiation 
issues and other trade disputes cannot be settled easily 
within the Chinese legal framework, the selection of 
business partners involves high risks, especially where 
non-family members are involved. Thus, the tendency is 
to keep business, as much as possible, within the family or 
close kin relations. Reducing business risks becomes a 
prime objective of the formation of any business 
partnership. To evaluate the trustworthiness of their 
trading partners, the Chinese often employ a set of implicit, 
but specific, strategies. 
First, Guanxi networks are used widely to extend 
personal (family-based) relationships to business 
relationships. Chinese businessmen generally consider 
three types of network: family, friends and strangers[7] 
[15]. These three types of network represent how well a 
person can trust their business partners. For example, 
Chinese traders often trace the genealogy of their potential 
partners to see if there is any family linkage. This does not 
mean that they will necessarily trust their partners as long 
as a kinship link is found. The purpose will be to use 
family relatedness as a way of tracing the partners’ 
background, in order to learn about their credit, past 
record of business practice, and personal integrity. 
Forming business partnerships, for most Chinese traders, 
is like establishing life-long friendships. For Chinese 
traders, Guanxi is not just about forming business 
relationships but also about forming personal friendships, 
with the purpose of reducing business risks. 
Second, having these networks as a method of 
checking personal credentials is not enough. Chinese 
traders also develop an implicit method for evaluating 
personal integrity, reducible to one ultimate question: how 
can I trust this person with my business? Chinese traders 
employ tacit communication protocols, known as 
high-context communication: messages are comparatively 
terse in words, but rich in meaning [22].  
For Chinese traders, metaphors are frequently used as 
a means for high-context communication. This has at least 
three purposes: to avoid direct conflicts, to test personal 
integrity and intelligence, and to communicate meaning 
with maximum ambiguity (so no one has to promise 
anything and rush into partnerships). Additionally, in 
order to assess trustworthiness it is more important to 
observe the other person’s social behavior than to consider 
what the person says rhetorically.  
Third, building business partnerships in this 
Guanxi-based context breeds favoritism. However, one 
must not be tempted to attribute negative meanings (such 
as bribery) to favoritism; otherwise, one may only see 
favoritism in terms of its face value. Favoritism is 
considered as an appropriate way to maintain existing 
Guanxi networks in Chinese business communities [14].  
Understanding the socio-cultural context in Chinese 
business communities helps one appreciate its influence 
on the rate of acceptance of e-marketplaces. The 
introduction of e-marketplaces will inevitably threaten 
Chinese traders’ existing ways of building and 
maintaining Guanxi networks. Identifying suppliers 
through a computer interface presumes that buyers can 
reasonably trust suppliers, but this assumption conflicts 
with the traditional Chinese Guanxi approach to assessing 
potential partners. Although Chinese traders could 
identify more promising suppliers by using an 
e-marketplace, they would also be hesitant to replace 
existing suppliers for fear of jeopardizing long-standing 
Guanxi networks. 
Chinese adopters thus perceive the e-marketplace as 
an unsophisticated way to minimize business risks, 
especially without the fluid assistance gained by 
mobilizing their Guanxi networks. Additionally, for 
Chinese traders used to conducting businesses through 
human interactions, i.e. through the social processes 
normally used to make friends and gain recognition in 
business communities, the depersonalized system features 
were perceived as obstacles to a properly social business 
relation. For the Chinese, good business practice should 
involve assessing trusted persons through existing Guanxi 
networks, building business partnerships through personal 
relationships, and maintaining Guanxi through in-group 
favoritism and reciprocity. According to these 
assumptions, the e-marketplace based on 
technical-economic assumption seems to add little value, 
and is insensitive, to these Chinese adopters’ social 
expectation of technology use. 
 
5. Implications: The Significant Role of Context 
A frequent comment suggested by adopters of these 
three e-marketplaces is that e-marketplaces seem to be an 
American management practice that does not fit easily 
with Asian contexts. But, why do they make such 
comments? Our study offers a contextualist explanation. 
This research highlights three kinds of contextual 
influence on e-marketplace acceptance: the structural 
contexts, national/regional, and socio-cultural. First, the 
study of IndiaMarket supports Markus and Soh’s [21] 
observations concerning the effect of structural conditions. 
Structural constraints, such as the lack of logistic, 
financial, educational, and legal infrastructures, can 
significantly influence the decision to accept technology. 
Particularly, such structural influences are often difficult 
to resolve within a short period of time, as they are deeply 
 
 
embedded in political and economic systems within a 
country.  
Second, our findings in the TaiwanMarket case 
resemble those in Avgerou’s [2] study of the unsuccessful 
adoption of e-marketplace in Cyprus. The changing 
national/regional context redefines the role of information 
systems in business operations. Non-acceptance occurs 
because adopters cannot see the relevance of technology 
use in response to the challenge imposed by their specific 
national or regional context. For many such local contexts 
the customary business practice are of more salience than 
the efficient markets assumed elsewhere. 
Third, ChinaMarket’s case echoes SPRINTEL’s 
failure in Italy [18]. Similar propositions are also 
supported by other research: for example, Martinsons and 
Westwood’s [22] study of MIS adoption in Chinese 
enterprises, and Walsham and Sahay’s [26] investigation 
of Geographical Information Systems in India. 
Generally, Asian-based studies, such as Kendall et al.’s 
[17] survey of e-commerce adoption in Singapore, and 
Hempel and Kwong’s [12] investigation of B2B 
e-commerce in China, overlook such contextual 
influences. Our aim in this study is to urge practitioners 
and researchers not to limit their evaluation to the 
technical-economic dimension of adoption problems, 
thereby failing to appreciate the more subtle aspect of 
contextual influence.  
 
6. Conclusion  
The three case studies offer an initial explanation of 
the adoption challenge of e-marketplace in three 
geographical regions in Asia. The analysis focuses on the 
embedded context for business activity rather than the 
technological features and organizational processes. We 
conclude that the resistance to e-marketplace was not 
limited to technological, organizational and 
inter-organizational impediments. In the three cases it is 
more important to understand the role of context in 
shaping adopters’ expectation of technology use [10], 
which in turn led to non-acceptance. In this situation, 
adopters were unclear how an e-marketplace would add 
value to their businesses. Hence, if e-marketplace use is 
perceived as irrelevant to the expectation of the adopters – 
expectations shaped by contexts – the entire adoption 
effort may wither before technology has a chance to take 
root. Hence, effective adoption of technology depends on 
a consideration of how people’s expectation of technology 
use is met in a given context. The lens of context adds a 
fruitful, alternative perspective in explaining and 
anticipating technology outcomes.  
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